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Tommaso Padoa-Schioppa was one of the great architects of the euro. He is remembered in 
particular as co-rapporteur for the Delors Committee and as a founding member of the European 
Central Bank's Executive Board. For Padoa-Schioppa, becoming Director-General of the European 
Commission's DG II (from 1979 to 1983), was a defining moment in his career and life. This period 
is the main focus of this paper. At the Commission, Padoa-Schioppa's main priority was the 
European Monetary System, which was launched in March 1979. He was closely involved in 
several projects to strengthen the EMS, to improve economic policy convergence and the position 
of the ECU. The other main objective for Padoa-Schioppa was the strengthening of DG  II's 
analytical capacity, especially its model-building capacity and its links with the academic world. As 
such, he played a crucial role in the professionalisation of economics at the Commission and in 
preparing DG II for the important role it would play in the EMU process. At the Commission, 
Padoa-Schioppa became also immersed in several European networks. Of crucial importance here 
were his contacts with Jacques Delors. This would be of major importance for his further career, 
becoming one of the architects of the single currency. 
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Tommaso Padoa-Schioppa (1940-2010) was a convinced European federalist. He was 
one of the great architects of the euro, the single currency. He is especially known as a 
co-rapporteur of the Delors Committee (1988-1989) and as a founding member of the 
Executive Board of the European Central Bank (1998-2005). 
 
According to Jacques Delors, a close friend, action based on an exceptionally wide and 
rich analysis was typical for Padoa-Schioppa, "La pensée et l'action. Telle est la réflexion 
première qui me vient à l'esprit lorsque j'évoque Tommaso Padoa-Schioppa. La pensée 
est assise sur une culture exceptionnelle allant de l'histoire à l'économie, sans oublier la 
science politique et donc l'art de gouverner et les exigences démocratiques"1 (Delors, 
2011, 174).2 
 
Padoa-Schioppa was an economist by training. And while he always maintained strong 
links with the academic world, he was essentially a very influential policy-maker. Lorenzo 
Bini Smaghi, his successor in the Executive Board of the ECB, described 
Padoa-Schioppa's very rich and eclectic style of economics thus: "Tommaso defined 
himself as a 'practioner', a policy-maker, but his action was always deeply and 
unambiguously grounded in economic thought. … he shared Keynes' view that practical 
men are often slaves of some defunct economist. Even in his early years as an 
economist, he identified those risks of enslavement and then sought to free himself from 
them by way of his life-long policy engagement: the dichotomy between general economic 
equilibrium theory and monetary theory; the dichotomy between Nationalökonomie and 
international economy; and the dichotomy between economic theory and institutions. He 
always aspired to bring these dichotomies to an end, by properly integrating the monetary, 
international and institutional dimensions into his assessment of economic policy" 
(Bini-Smaghi, 2011). 
 
At the core of Padoa-Schioppa's thinking was the importance of institutions. As 
emphasised by Visco (2011, 2), "Institutions and their design indeed constituted a leitmotif 
in his thinking, whether in connection with central banking, market infrastructures, 
                                                 
1  "Thought and action. Those are the first things that spring to mind when I recall Tommaso 
Padoa-Schioppa. The thought is based on an exceptional culture ranging from history to economics, not to 
mention political science and thus the art of governance and democratic requirements.". 
2  Padoa-Schioppa would also become President of "Notre Europe" which was founded by Delors in 1996.  
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European integration or global monetary arrangements. He always stressed the need to 
clearly identify the nature and scope of the public good needed to be provided in order to 
design the most suitable set of rules and institutional framework case by case. At the 
same time, he had a dynamic view of issues and institutions: only by looking at underlying 
economic trends could one predict which new demands would drive the evolution of 
institutions in the future ... A fundamental insight of his - from early on in his career as an 
economist   and, let me add, as a political scientist - was that growing economic and 
financial integration and interdependence, both in Europe and at the global level, would 
inevitably require a profound rethinking not only of how to allocate policy-making 
responsibilities but of the very concept of national sovereignty. He certainly did not 
underestimate the difficulty of this process or the resistance it would meet." The 
importance of institutions went also along with Padoa-Schioppa's approach of taking a 
long-term perspective, grounded in history and culture, but also very much forward 
looking. It was an approach he shared very much with Jacques Delors. 
 
A crucial moment in the career of Padoa-Schioppa was his time as a Director-General for 
Economic and Financial Affairs at the European Commission, from June 1979 to March 
1983. This period will be very much at the centre of this paper. We first go into the 
formation of Padoa-Schioppa and the situation of the European Community at the end of 
the 1970s. Thereafter, we focus on his activities at the Commission as Director-General 
for Economic and Financial Affairs. The last section analyses the later career of 
Padoa-Schioppa as an architect of EMU. 
 
2.  THE FORMATION OF TOMMASO PADOA-SCHIOPPA 
Tommaso Padoa-Schioppa was born in 1940 in the Alpine town of Belluno in the Venezia 
region. He studied economics at the Bocconi University in Milan, one of the most 
prominent Italian universities. He joined the Banca d’Italia in 1968. He made an early 
career at the research department, one of the leading policy oriented research institutes in 
Europe, with strong connections with prominent American and British universities (Porta, 
1996, 180).  
 
The internationalisation of Italian economics was very much stimulated by the Bonaldo 
Stringher fellowships, awarded by the Banca d'Italia in honour of a former Governor, from 
the 1930s onwards. Initially, the fellows went mainly to Great Britain, especially 
Cambridge (Sraffa), Oxford and the LSE. From the 1960s and 1970s onwards, they went  
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increasingly to the United States, notably the Massachusetts Institute of Technology 
(Modigliani). Many of these fellows returned to the Banca d'Italia, thus contributing further 
to the international links of the Bank of Italy (Maes, 2008). Also Padoa-Schioppa received 
a Bonaldo Stringher fellowership and went to the MIT, where he obtained a M. Sc. in 
1970. 
 
At the beginning of the 1960s, under the governorship of Guido Carli, the Bank of Italy 
took an important step in the professionalisation of its Research Department, with the 
construction of a macroeconomic model. Guido Rey became responsible for the real side 
of the model and Antonio Fazio for the monetary part. Rey went for a study visit to the 
Dutch Central Planning Bureau, where Tinbergen was the director. Fazio went to MIT, to 
study with Franco Modigliani, not only because he was an Italian and a famous monetary 
economist, but also for his experience with the creation of the FED-MIT model. In the 
mid-1960s, Franco Modigliani became a consultant to the Bank of Italy, to advise it on 
building its econometric model (Modigliani, 1999). So, the Banca d'Italia maintained strong 
international academic connections and played a leading role in the modernisation of 
economics, both in Italy and in the world of the (European) central banks. It is further 
noteworthy that, in the 1960s and early 1970s, most of the Bank of Italy's international 
contacts were with "moderate Keynesians", like Hicks, Samuelson, Modigliani, Klein or 
Tobin (Ciocca 2004, 592). 
 
So Padoa-Schioppa became strongly embedded in the Anglo-Saxon economics tradition. 
Not only was Bocconi one of the most internationally orientated universities in Italy and 
had the Research Department of the Banca d'Italia a prominent place in the world of the 
central banks. He was also a student and, later, a visiting scholar at the MIT. He was 
close to Franco Modigliani, publishing research papers together (Modigliani and 
Padoa-Schioppa, 1978) and he contributed to Modigliani’s Festschrift (Padoa-Schioppa, 
1987). 
 
In the second half of the 1970s, Padoa-Schioppa was seconded from the Bank of Italy to 
the Treasury, where Filippo Pandolfi was Treasury Minister. Whilst there, he wrote an 
economic adjustment programme, which became known as the Pandolfi plan. So, 
Padoa-Schioppa gained an important insight into the economic policy-making process in 
Italy. Moreover, when the position of Director-General for Economic and Financial Matters 
at the European Commission became vacant in 1979, Pandolfi pushed for the nomination 




3.  THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY AT THE END OF THE 1970S 
The period from 1979 to 1983, when Padoa-Schioppa was Director-General of DG II, was 
not an easy period for the European Community. The European economy was coping with 
stagflation, after the oil shocks of the 1970s, while the European integration process was 
languishing. Moreover, Europe's growth performance in the mid 1980s was lagging behind 
the United States (see also Chart 1). It was a period which was known as "Eurosclerosis". 
 
 








In his own "General Report" on the activities of DG II during his time at the Commission, 
Padoa-Schioppa (1983) himself gave a vivid description of the period, emphasising the 
return of national sovereignty, "La communauté, quant aux objectifs ultimes que lui ont 
assignés ses fondateurs, est sur la défensive depuis plusieurs années. Malgré les progrès 
réalisés, la simple affirmation des objectifs politiques ultimes n'est généralement tolérée 
que si elle prend la forme d'un appel rhétorique. L'intangibilité de la souveraineté 
nationale est redevenue un dogme. Ce dogme paralyse la Communauté dans sa vocation 
à la dynamique. Cette paralysie déforme la Communauté. Cette déformation est à son 
tour invoquée comme un argument supplémentaire contre le 'vieux' projet de l'intégration   
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politique3". Padoa-Schioppa (1983, 4). He further described how the Commission had lost 
its driving role in the process of European integration, "De la dynamique communautaire, 
la Commission a été conçue comme le moteur. En réalité, dans cette fonction, la 
Commission est un organisme gravement touché par le tournant de la deuxième moitié 
des années '60. Depuis, dans la plupart des cas, lorsque mouvement il y a eu, le moteur 
en était ailleurs: le Conseil européen, le duo Giscard-Schmidt, etc. La Commission est 
paralysée4" (Padoa-Schioppa, 1983, 5) 5. 
 
In the second half of the 1970s, there were two important advances in European 
integration, albeit of a very different nature: the first direct elections for the European 
Parliament and the establishment of the European Monetary System, both in 1979. 
 
The European Monetary System was very much an initiative of the French president 
Giscard d’Estaing and the German chancellor Helmut Schmidt (Ludlow, 1982). The EMS 
was launched against a backdrop of considerable scepticism, especially from academic 
economists but also from monetary experts who still had vivid memories of the "snake" 
unravelling. However, political leaders pushed strongly for the EMS and succeeded in 
getting it off the ground. The EMS was thus a “victory of political intuition over expert 
opinion” (Mortensen, 1990, 28). 
 
According to the 1978 Council Resolution, the European Monetary System was a 
“scheme for the creation of closer monetary cooperation leading to a zone of monetary 
stability in Europe”. Monetary stability, the objective of the EMS, had a double dimension: 
internal and external. This was a compromise and synthesis between the ideas of the 
“monetarists”, led by France, emphasising the importance of external stability (exchange 
rate stability) and of the “economists”, led by Germany, advocating internal stability (price 
stability) and the coordination of economic policy (Maes, 2002). 
                                                 
3   "As for the end goals assigned to it by its founding fathers, the Community has been on the defensive for 
several years now. Despite the progress that has been made, the simple statement of the ultimate political 
objectives is generally only tolerated if it takes the form of a rhetorical appeal. The inviolability of national 
sovereignty has become a dogma once again and this dogma is paralysing the Community in its vocation 
as a dynamic force. This paralysis is distorting the Community. This distortion is in turn cited as another 
argument against the 'old' political integration project." 
4     "The Commision was designed to be the driving force behind the dynamics of the European Community. In 
reality, in this role, the Commission is an institution seriously affected by the turning point in the second 
half of the 1960s. Since then, in most cases, when there has been some movement, the driving force 
behind it was somewhere else: the European Council, the Giscard-Schmidt tandem, etc. The Commission 
is paralysed.". 





The European Monetary System was composed of three main elements: the exchange 
rate mechanism (ERM), credit mechanisms and the European Currency Unit (or ECU). 
 
At the core of the European Monetary System was the exchange rate mechanism. This 
may seem somewhat paradoxical, since not all currencies in the European Community 
participated. The original members were the German mark, the Dutch guilder, the French 
franc, the Danish krone, the Belgian/Luxembourg franc, the Irish pound and the Italian lira. 
The British pound did not join. 
 
To bolster the credibility of the exchange rate mechanism, several credit mechanisms 
were foreseen: very short-term, short-term and medium-term, as well as the Community 
loan mechanism. While the first two were central bank financing for currency support, the 
latter two offered balance of payments assistance linked to policy adjustment 
programmes. 
 
The EMS also established the ECU. It was a basket currency comprising the currencies of 
the European Community Member States, including those currencies that did not 
participate in the exchange rate mechanism. The original aim was for the ECU to play a 
key role in the functioning of the ERM, both as an indicator of the source of tension in the 
foreign exchange markets and as a means of settling central bank debts arising from 
currency support operations. However, the first element never materialised, as, like in the 
snake, the parity grid became the indicator of tensions on the foreign exchange markets. 
The second element, the ECU as a means of settling central bank debts, remained 
subject to restrictions. Instead, the ECU took on a significant role in the international 
financial markets, thanks also to the Commission's efforts. It was an important project for 
Padoa-Schioppa. 
 
The EMS agreement also specified a second institutional phase, with the creation of a 
European Monetary Fund, within two years of the start of the EMS. However, the 
functions of this Fund were never really agreed upon, and the plans were shelved in 
December 1980.  
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4.  TOMMASO PADOA-SCHIOPPA AS DIRECTOR-GENERAL OF DG II 
Padoa-Schioppa arrived at the European Commission in June 1979, less than three 
months after the start of the EMS on 13 March 19796. He had a profound impact on DG II. 
According to witnesses, he was not only a skillful administrator, but also a brilliant 
economist and very well connected. He combined a German rigour7 with Italian 
imagination and a profound economic culture, including mainstream Anglo-Saxon 
economics. He was quite young then (not yet 40 when he arrived), dynamic and rather 
ambitious. 
 
His main focus of attention was the reinforcement of the European Monetary System, 
which he considered as the “priority of priorities”. As he observed on the EMS in his 
"General Report", "son démarrage en 1979, son bon fonctionnement ensuite, son 
approfondissement en 1982, ont constitué la priorité des priorités, et j'y ai consacré une 
grande partie de mon temps. Mais ce champ recouvre aussi le développement 
spectaculaire du circuit privé de l'écu, les tentatives d'améliorer la coopération monétaire 
internationale et de progresser dans l'intégration financière européenne. S'il fallait 
caractériser par un seul thème le temps de mon service à la DG II, je choisirais le SME"8 
(Padoa-Schioppa, 1983, 12-13). His other main preoccupation was strengthening the 
analytical level of DG II. Before we go into Padoa-Schioppa's activities at DG II, we first 
provide a short overview of macroeconomic thought and policy at the European 
Commission9. 
 
4.1 ECONOMIC THOUGHT AND POLICY-MAKING AT THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION 
 
Macroeconomic policy-making in the European Community was mainly at the level of the 
Member States and so the responsibilities of the Commission10 were rather limited. It is 
                                                 
6   The start was foreseen for 1 January, but was delayed due to disagreements on the impact of the EMS on 
the Common Agricultural Policy. 
7   He was known for being very strict on the time accorded for an appointment, for instance, from 19h20 to 
19h28. 
8  "Its start-up in 1979, its smooth functioning thereafter, its expansion in 1982 constituted the priority of 
priorities, and I devoted a great deal of my time to that. But this field also covers the spectacular 
development of the private ECU, attempts to improve international monetary cooperation and to advance 
European financial integration. If I had to put my time at DG II into one sole category, I would choose the 
EMS.". 
9   Padoa-Schioppa (1985) contains the main articles which he wrote during his time at the Commission. 
10  It can be useful to note that the term “Commission” is used both for the College of the Commission, the 
body of Commissioners, and for the services of the commission, the administration. Also, every Member of 
the Commission disposes of a small group of collaborators, his so-called “cabinet”.  
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the College of Commissioners which is ultimately responsible for policy-making at the 
European Commission. In this field, it involved mainly the orientation and coordination of 
national macroeconomic policies (Wegner, 1989). Over time, this coordination function of 
the Commission has grown in importance. With EMU, which started in January 1999, 
sovereignty in the field of monetary policy was transferred to the European Central Bank 
and the Commission’s role in the coordination of macroeconomic policies was reinforced. 
 
Inside the Commission, it is mainly the president and the member with the responsibility 
for DG II (Economic and Financial Affairs or ECFIN, which can be considered as the 
macroeconomic analysis and research department of the Commission) who are most 
involved in macroeconomic policy-making. When Padoa-Schioppa arrived at the 
Commission in June 1979, Roy Jenkins (UK) was in the president's seat, and 
François-Xavier Ortoli, a Frenchman, was responsible for DG  II. From 1981 to 1984, 
Gaston Thorn, a Luxemburger, was president, while François-Xavier Ortoli remained 
responsible for DG II. According to witnesses, they were relatively easy-going people, who 
left the administration a lot of freedom. Ortoli was mostly interested in monetary matters.  
 
DGII's Director-Generals were typically Italians, with first two diplomats, Bobba and 
Mosca. From June 1979 to March 1983, Tommaso Padoa-Schioppa was Director-General 
of DG II. He was succeeded by Massimo Russo, who had made most of his career at the 
International Monetary Fund. 
 
Macroeconomic thinking at the Commission was, to a large extent, a synthesis and 
compromise of the main schools of macroeconomic thought in the European countries, 
especially the three big ones: Germany, France and the United Kingdom11. 
 
German economic thought was centred around the social market economy. Two strands 
can be distinguished. The more free-market-oriented German economists would 
emphasise that economic policy was, in essence, Ordnungspolitik, i.e. a policy to create a 
sound and secure framework within which markets can operate. The main tasks of 
economic policy are then: (a) monetary policy: ensure price stability; (b) fiscal policy: 
rather limited task for the government, sound public finances are important; and 
(c)  structural policy: emphasis on competition policy. The other tendency, more 
Keynesian, with Karl  Schiller as an important representative, emphasised the social 
dimension of the “social market economy”. It was linked to the social democrats and the 
                                                 
11  For an overview of post-1945 economic thought in Europe, see the contributions in Coats, 2000.  
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trade unions and considered a dialogue between the social partners (trade unions and 
employers) as a crucial element of its strategy to stimulate growth and employment. 
 
German economists generally tended to emphasise that economic policy consisted in the 
application of certain basic economic principles (especially the respect of market 
mechanisms and wage moderation) to the actual policy challenges. It has certain 
similarities with Roy Harrod’s characterisation of Keynes’s view: “Following Marshall, he 
(= Keynes) believed... that progress in economics would be in the application of theory to 
practical problems. His recipe for the young economist was to know his Marshall 
thoroughly and read his Times every day carefully, without bothering too much about the 
large mass of contemporary publication in book form” (Harrod, 1951, 381). 
 
Initially, French economic ideas were very influential at the Commission. Robert Marjolin, 
the first Commissioner for DG II, had been the principal assistant to Monnet at the French 
Planning Office, famous for its five-year plans (Marjolin, 1986). The French Planning 
Office, while being part of the French “Colbertist” tradition, was also a spearhead of 
Keynesianism in France, with the national accounts at its heart (Rosanvallon, 1987, 40). 
Later, Malinvaud was influential, especially with his distinction between “Keynesian” and 
“classical” unemployment (Malinvaud, 1977). 
 
Anglo-Saxon ideas in the post-war period followed different fads: Keynesianism, 
monetarism and supply-side economics. This was also the case at the Commission, even 
if monetarism was less popular. From a methodological point of view, the Anglo-Saxons 
generally favoured a more analytical approach, in which economic policy 
recommendations would be based on more refined economic research. They especially 
favoured developing DG II’s model-building capacity. 
 
Initially, an important transmission channel for Anglo-Saxon ideas was the OECD. Many 
Commission officials, including Marjolin, had worked at the OECD and there were many 
interactions between the OECD and the Commission. Anglo-Saxon ideas received a big 
boost with the nomination of Padoa-Schioppa as Director-General of DG II (see section 
4.3). Also, younger economists had a more Anglo-Saxon education, with more of them 
having studied in the United States and gained a Ph.D. (Maes, 2000). 




4.2 THE STRENGTHENING OF THE EMS 
 
Padoa-Schioppa's first priority in monetary matters was to avoid the EMS becoming a 
repetition of the snake, which was characterised not only by realignments, but also by 
several countries leaving. Moreover, decisions about this were very much national 
decisions, not Community decisions. Furthermore, the snake did not really contribute to 
policy convergence.  
 
Another crucial priority for Padoa-Schioppa was to strengthen the Commission's position 
in the management of the EMS, which was largely in the hands of the central banks12. He 
therefore reinforced the Monetary Directorate of DG II. He created an EMS desk, so that 
the Commission had the necessary information on the functioning of the EMS. DG II also 
developed a "Manual" with all the procedures and timing for a realignment. 
Table 1 - Changes in central rates in the exchange rate mechanism of the EMS 
(March 1979 - January 1987, normal fluctuation margin of 2.25 %) 
 
Date  DEM  NLG  FRF  DKK  BEF/ 
LUF 
IEP  ITL 
13.03.79  Start  Start  Start  Start  Start  Start  Start
1 
24.09.79  +2.0      -2.9       
30.11.79        -4.8       
23.03.81              -6.0 
05.10.81  +5.5  +5.5  -3.0        -3.0 
22.02.82        -3.0  -8.5     
14.06.82  +4.25  +4.25  -5.75        -2.75 
21.03.83  +5.5  +3.5  -2.5  +2.5  +1.5  -3.5  -2.5 
22.07.85  +2.0  +2.0  +2.0  +2.0  +2.0  +2.0  -6.0 
06.04.86  +3.0  +3.0  -3.0  +1.0  +1.0     
04.08.86            -8.0   
12.01.87  +3.0  +3.0      +2.0     
1  Fluctuation margin of 6 %.  
 
Over time, the realignments in the EMS became more collective decisions. 
Padoa-Schioppa (1985) tells the story of the first realignments: "The first one took place in 
                                                 
12  For an analysis of how the Commission tried to increase its role in monetary matters in the 1960s (and its 
relations with the central banks), see Maes, 2006.  
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September 1979, less than six months after the System had started. I remember vividly 
that the Secretary of State of the German Ministry of Finance - it was Mr. Lahnstein at the 
time - came to the realignment session with a list of what the new parities were to be, 
saying: 'We have thought about the situation and have come to the conclusion that the 
following parity changes have to be made'. The session was rather difficult. It succeeded 
in setting new parities, which were in the direction indicated by that list, but not identical. It 
was clear to all that the next realignment would have to be made differently. At the first 
meeting of the Monetary Committee after the realignment, Mr. Lahnstein himself 
expressed the view that the Commission should propose the new parity grid on the next 
occasion. In a sense, this episode can be seen as the switch from the 1972 agreement on 
exchange rates (the so-called Snake) to the EMS".  
 
The second and the third realignments, however, were not really collective, but unilateral 
decisions on devaluations of the Danish crown and Italian lira. Moreover, the Commission 
was not involved in the central bank consultations on the Danish devaluation of 
30  November  1979. The Commission complained then that it should be part of the 
consultations, especially because of its responsabilities for the Common Agricultural 
Policy. 
 
Padoa-Schioppa (1985) aptly summarised the change in the situation by saying: "Thus, 
what can be called the hegemonic method was abandoned after the first realignment and 
the unilateral method typical of Bretton Woods after the third. Since then, all the 
realignments haven been made properly, in the sense that on each occasion there was a 
meeting at the Community level, with the realignment being decided only after all the 
member countries had had an opportunity to propose a change in parities alternative to 
that asked for by the applicant country".  
 
In the autumn of 1979, Padoa-Schioppa was also very much involved in Commission 
proposals to strengthen economic policy coordination13. A crucial element were 
preliminary consultations on monetary policy. At the November meeting of the Committee 
of Governors, Ortoli announced the new Commission document and its main ideas: 
"Monsieur Ortoli signale que la Commission, en exécution d'un mandat d'examiner les 
possibilités d'améliorer la coordination des politiques économiques, envisage de présenter 
prochainement au Conseil des Ministres un document qui suggérera une procédure 
beaucoup plus précise qu'actuellement pour les grandes décisions nationales en matière 
                                                 
13  Economic policy coordination was also a topic of the November 1979 Dublin European summit.  
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de politiques monétaires et, en particulier, de politiques de taux d'intérêt. Cette procédure, 
qui toucherait le fonctionnement des Comités, s'inspire de l'idée que les décisions de 
politique monétaire, notamment dans le cas d'un grand pays, ne restent pas sans 
influence sur l'évolution à l'intérieur du SME et que par conséquent de telles décisions 
devraient être soumises à une consultation préalable à haut niveau... De la sorte, tout en 
respectant la responsabilité nationale en matière de politique monétaire, les 
préoccupations communautaires seraient de plus en plus prises en considération, ce qui 
est indispensable, car, sans une meilleure coordination des politiques monétaires, le 
fonctionnement du SME serait mis en péril14" (Minutes of the 139th Meeting of the EEC 
Committee of Governors, 13 November 1979, NBBA). The first reaction was from Otmar 
Emminger, the then the president of the Bundesbank, "Monsieur Emminger constate 
qu'on tend à mettre en relief uniquement les mesures de la politique monétaire allemande 
tandis qu'on passe sous silence le fait que d'autres autorités de la Communauté ont pris, 
au cours des derniers mois, des mesures également sans consultation préalable15" 
(Minutes of the 139th Meeting of the EEC Committee of Governors, 13 November 1979, 
NBBA) 16. 
 
In the following months, the Commission's proposal was analysed by the central banks. At 
the January 1980 meeting, the Governors' alternates reported on their discussions: "les 
Suppléants sont d'avis que les consultations préalables sur les politiques monétaires sont 
souhaitables mais qu'en pratique elles peuvent être difficiles, voire impossibles, étant 
donné la variété, au sein de la CEE, des procédures et des structures qui sont mises en 
jeu pour prendre les décisions. … Toutefois, quelques Suppléants ont souligné que la 
politique monétaire étant définie dans la plupart des pays en termes d'objectifs quantitatifs 
                                                 
14 "Mr. Ortoli points out that, in carrying out its mandate to look into ways of improving coordination of 
economic policies, the Commission is shortly planning to present the Council of Ministers with a document 
that will suggest a much more precise procedure than that used at the moment for major domestic 
decisions on monetary policy and, in particular, interest rate policies. This procedure, which would affect 
the way the Committees work, is inspired by the fact that monetary policy decisions, especially in the case 
of a large country, are not without influence on the internal development of the EMS and that, 
consequently, such decisions should be submitted to prior high-level consultation... In that way, while 
respecting national responsibility for monetary policy, Community concerns would be increasingly taken 
into account, something which is essential, because, without better coordination of monetary policies, the 
operation of the EMS would be jeopardised.". 
15  "Mr. Emminger notes that there is a tendency to emphasise only the German monetary policy measures, 
while saying nothing about the fact that other Community authorities have also taken measures in recent 
months without prior consultation". 
16 It is noteworthy that, from June 1979 onwards, Ortoli became more active in the meetings of the 
Committee of Governors.  
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officiels, des consultations préalables pourraient avoir lieu sur la fixation des objectifs17" 
(Minutes of the 141th Meeting of the EEC Committee of Governors, 8 January 1980, 
NBBA). During the meeting, Karl-Otto Pöhl, the new president of the Bundesbank, insisted 
that the Commission should inform the Council of Ministers of the central bank governors' 
reservations about preliminary consultations with respect to monetary policy decisions, 
"Monsieur Pöhl pense néanmoins que la Commission devrait informer le Conseil des 
réserves qui ont été formulées au sein du Comité à l'égard d'une obligation de 
consultation préalable pour toute décision d'une politique monétaire et de crédit18" 
(Minutes of the 141th Meeting of the EEC Committee of Governors, 8 January 1980, 
NBBA). 
 
The early 1980s were a difficult time for the EMS, with tensions on the foreign exchange 
markets and several currency realignments (see Table 1). In order to stabilise the EMS, 
convergence of economic policies was crucial. The realignments turned out to be 
important moments in the convergence process (Padoa-Schioppa, 1983b). Contrary to 
earlier practice, when devaluations or revaluations were unilateral decisions, the 
realignments became collective decisions (mostly with meetings of the Ecofin Council). 
Padoa-Schioppa further succeeded in developing the role of the Commission in the 
accompanying adjustment policies, of crucial importance for the convergence process. As 
observed in the 1982 Commission analysis of the EMS, "At each of the last two 
realignments, the countries most affected agreed to implement accompanying policies 
which would enhance the beneficial effects and neutralize the perverse effects of the 
changes in parity. In Belgium, the February devaluation was an integral part of a recovery 
plan designed to resolve the structural problems in the economy... The June realignment 
is also indicative of a concern to establish greater convergence. In the countries whose 
currencies were devalued, stabilization policies are now being applied... The Commission 
has for its part actively encouraged the process of convergence. It has not confined itself 
simply to following trough as effectively as possible the coordination procedures for 
economic policies provided for in Community texts. It has tried to spell out what 
convergence should mean in practice" (CEC, 1982, 36). While there was a worldwide 
                                                 
17  "The Alternates feel that prior consultations on monetary policies are desirable but, in practice, they can be 
difficult, or even impossible, given the sheer variety of procedures and structures that are involved in 
decision making  within the EEC. …However, some Alternates stressed that since monetary policy in most 
countries was defined in terms of official quantitative targets, prior consultations could be held on setting 
targets.". 
18 "Mr. Pöhl nevertheless thinks the Commission should inform the Council of the reservations that have been 
raised within the Committee concerning the obligation for prior consultation for any decision on monetary 
policy or credit.".  
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tendency towards stability-oriented policies, the EMS was to play a significant role in 
policy adjustment and inflation convergence in the European Community in the 1980s 
(see Chart 2).  
 
 
Chart 2: Inflation in the main countries of the European Community  







Of special importance here was the situation in France, as the EMS was Giscard's "baby". 
A crucial problem for Padoa-Schioppa was the "adoption" of the EMS by Mitterrand, who 
had become French President in May 1981, with a socialist-communist government. He 
worked closely on this with Ortoli, his Commissioner, Delors, who had become French 
Finance Minister, and Andreatta, the Italian Finance Minister at the time. It was known as 
the "Delors - Andreatta - Ortoli – Padoa-Schioppa plot"19. The March 1983 realignment is 
generally considered as the turning point in the EMS, with a significant change in French 
economic policy, the famous politique de rigueur. 
 
As mentioned earlier, the EMS agreement also specified a second institutional phase, 
involving the establishment of a European Monetary Fund within two years of the start of 
                                                 
19  Ortoli and Delors had very good contacts. They had worked closely together in the mid-1970s, when they 
were both at the French Planning Office (Badel and Bussière, 2011).  
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the EMS. This was an important dossier for Padoa-Schioppa, in which he was very closely 
involved himself. 
 
The Commission put together proposals for this second institutional phase of the EMS, 
focusing on the creation of a European Monetary Fund, promoting the ECU and 
strengthening the external aspects of the EMS. However, the negotiations did not really 
take off and the plans were shelved in December 1980. Padoa-Schioppa was very sharp 
on this episode in his "General Report", singling out in particular the resistance of 
Germany and the Bundesbank for causing this failure, "Il y a de multiples raisons à cela: 
le deuxième choc pétrolier, la nouvelle flambée inflationniste qui l'a suivi, l'envol du dollar, 
les tensions centrifuges consécutives à ces développements. Mais la raison essentielle a 
été, d'une façon générale, la méfiance affichée au fond, et parfois en public, par les 
autorités monétaires du pays ayant la monnaie la plus forte. Une opinion publique qui 
n'était déjà pas très favorable au système, a été flattée dans ses sentiments anti-SME par 
l'autorité même chargée de sa gestion20" (Padoa-Schioppa, 1983, 30). He considered 
1982, a year of severe turmoil in the exchange rate mechanism, as a turning point: "Cette 
attitude a changé quand, en mai 1982, l'existence du système a été en danger. Il a alors 
été compris que l'enjeu était d'abord économique et commercial, avant d'être monétaire, 
et que le SME n'avait jamais vraiment affaibli la défense de la stabilité monétaire. Il était 
trop tard pour faire aboutir l'initiative de l'approfondissement. C'est grâce à la sagesse de 
la France et des autres pays membres du système, que le scepticisme allemand n'a pas 
été fatal21" (Padoa-Schioppa, 1983, 30). 
 
Padoa-Schioppa then sought other ways to strengthen the EMS. These efforts culminated 
in the European Commission's March 1982 proposals for a "non-institutional" 
development of the EMS. There were several rather technical, ideas. A first element was 
to strengthen the position of the ECU and the exchange rate mechanism, for instance by 
increasing the negotiability of the ECU, by expanding the use of Community currencies for 
                                                 
20 "There are many reasons for that: the second oil shock, the new wave of inflation that came after it, the 
dollar soaring, and the centrifugal tensions following these developments. But the main reason has, 
generally speaking, been the mistrust displayed deep down, and sometimes even in public, by the 
monetary authorities of the country with the strongest currency. The anti-EMS sentiment of a public that 
was already not exactly in favour of the system was even encouraged by the authority in charge of its 
management". 
21  "This attitude changed when, in May 1982, the very existence of the system was in danger. By then, it was 
generally recognised that the stakes were primarily economic and commercial, before monetary, and that 
the EMS had never really weakened the defence of monetary stability. It was too late to bring the 
'deepening' initiative to a successful conclusion. It is thanks to the wisdom of France and the system's 
other member countries that German scepticism has not been fatal".  
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intra-marginal interventions and by coordinating relations vis-à-vis the dollar. Secondly, 
the Commission proposed to open up the system to the outside world by permitting third-
country monetary authorities to hold and use ECUs. Thirdly, there was a chapter on 
encouraging the use of the ECU on the financial markets, for instance, by increasing the 
ECU borrowing and lending activity of Community institutions and by keeping restrictions 
on the use of the EEC's basket currency to a minimum. It was to become a cherished 
topic for Padoa-Schioppa. A fourth dimension was a reinforcement of policy convergence, 
stressing full use of the existing framework and improving follow-up measures. 
 
But the Commission not only proposed technical improvements for the EMS, it also drew 
up proposals with a more political content. These focused on the full participation of all 
currencies in the exchange rate mechanism and the issue of an ECU coin. Of crucial 
importance for the Commission was the participation of all EU currencies. As stressed by 
the Commission, "The European Monetary System will not assume its full significance and 
will not achieve its full potential until it organizes, on an equal footing, the exchange rate 
relationships of all the Community currencies: sterling's, and later the drachma's, 
participation in the exchange rate mechanism (and the narrowing to 2.25 % of the Italian 
lira's present margins) would bring the system to full fruition and would act as a signal to 
the markets and to public opinion of the determination to pursue in common the 
attempt - accepted and recognized by all - to establish a zone of monetary stability in 
Europe" (CEC, 1982, 52). The Commission further defended the idea of an ECU coin, 
which would circulate freely throughout the Community. This should strike public opinion 
by "bringing the ECU out of the specialists' circle (central banks, exchange dealers, capital 
market operators) to which it is now confined, and putting it in the pocket of the man in the 
street, the ECU's destiny as the monetary symbol of the Community would be fully 
affirmed" (CEC, 1982, 52). 
 
Padoa-Schioppa was known for always taking a long-term perspective. One of the issues 
which he was also aiming for was progress in financial integration (which had dropped out 
of the monetary discussions in the 1970s, cf. Maes, 2007). Padoa-Schioppa also began to 
focus closely on the long-term consequences of a stable EMS and financial integration. In 
a lecture in Milan in June 1982, he coined his famous "inconsistent quartet" saying, the 
impossibility of reconciling (1) free trade, (2) full capital mobility, (3) fixed (or at any rate 
managed) exchange rates and (4)  national autonomy of monetary policy. As 
Padoa-Schioppa (1982) observed, he was enlarging the "inconsistent trinity" of 
international monetary theory: "The incompatibility between fixed exchange rates, free  
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capital movements, and independent national monetary policies has been referred to in 
economic literature as the 'inconsistent trinity'. I have turned this trio into the 'inconsistent 
quartet' by adding a fourth element, free trade, which is a pillar of the Treaty of Rome and 
an aspect which cannot simply be taken for granted in our present economic 
environment". The inconsistent quartet would become very popular in the second half of 
the 1980s, when exchange rates were stable in the EMS and the European Community 
embarked on the Single Market project, when capital controls were lifted and the 
remaining non-tariff barriers in goods and services trade were removed (Padoa-Schioppa, 
1988). What is crucial is that for Padoa-Schioppa there was a strong link between a 
single, unified market and monetary integration. It was his profound conviction that the 
European Single Market would not survive without a single currency. 
 
Padoa-Schioppa was also very actively involved in the promotion of the ECU as a "parallel 
currency". For instance, he played an important role in the development of the ECU 
clearing system. Padoa-Schioppa (1987b) tells how, "In February 1982, prompted by 
Robert Triffin and Paul Caron, I convened the banks that were then active in the ECU 
market and invited them to set up a study group for the creation of a multilateral clearing 
system". During the mid-1980s, Padoa-Schioppa (1985) pushed further for a parallel 
currency approach. He hailed the "unforeseen growth of the ECU in private markets" as 
an important success. "What is important is that they show that there is considerable 
potential for an international currency used by private agents, and that the development of 
this potential only requires a very small legal, and one could say 'official', platform"22.  
 
In his "General Report" of February 1983, Padoa-Schioppa gave a mixed picture of the 
situation of the EMS at the time of his departure from the Commission. There was 
important progress, but there were also significant shortcomings, "Le SME s'est 
sensiblement renforcé par l'obtention, petit à petit, de deux résultats importants qui 
n'étaient pas acquis d'avance: i) les modifications de parités sont véritablement devenues 
des décisions collectives, beaucoup plus que ce n'était le cas dans le système de Bretton 
Woods; ii) il est devenu de règle que les changements de parités soient accompagnés par 
des mesures de politique économique... Les approfondissements du système "dans" 
l'acquis sont importants, mais non irréversibles. Il faut les consolider, et une telle 
consolidation ne sera durable que s'il y a extension "de" l'acquis. Pour cela, nos 
                                                 




propositions de mars 1982 ne représentaient qu'un petit pas. Le chemin vers l'union 
monétaire est encore long23" (Padoa-Schioppa, 1983, 13). 
 
4.3 STRENGTHENING THE ANALYTICAL CAPACITY OF DG II 
 
Padoa-Schioppa was fully aware that the Commission's powers in the area of 
macroeconomic policy-making were limited. Its main function was contributing to the 
coordination and orientation of the Member States' policies. Just as for other international 
institutions, persuasion was crucial. As observed by Coats (1986,  167), “skills in 
communication and the art of persuasion are generally at a premium in international 
agencies, given their limited powers”. To have an impact inside a multinational (and 
multilingual) organisation, communication and negotiation skills are more important than in 
national organisations24. Padoa-Schioppa stressed further that two elements were crucial 
for the Commission: professionalism and "telling the truth", "Le véritable instrument est la 
persuasion, les normes de base ne pouvant en aucun cas remplacer la qualité de 
l'argumentation. Si, dans ces domaines "non opérationnels", l'action est celle des autres, 
la Commission dispose néanmoins, pour persuader, de deux instruments:  la 
professionnalité et la possibilité de "dire la vérité25" (Padoa-Schioppa, 1983, 7). 
 
From his earlier experience at the Banca d'Italia, Padoa-Schioppa was also very much 
aware that the Commission's reputation in terms of economic analysis was not so strong. 
"Je savais, pour avoir été fonctionnaire national, que les documents, les analyses et les 
prises de position de la Commission en matière de politique économique et monétaire 
n'attiraient pas la même attention et ne jouissaient pas du même prestige que celles 
d'autres organismes internationaux. Les documents de la Commission avaient la 
réputation d'être trop nombreux, souvent inexacts, analytiquement pauvres et peu 
originaux. J'ai consacré une partie très importante de mon temps à une action sur les 
                                                 
23  "The EMS has been considerably strengthened by gradually obtaining two important results that were not 
acquired in advance: i) parity adjustments have genuinely become collective decisions, much more than 
was the case under the Bretton Woods system; ii) it has become standard for changes in exchange rates 
to be accompanied by economic policy measures... Moves to deepen the system within the acquis are 
important but not irreversible. They need to be consolidated and such consolidation would only be lasting if 
the acquis itself were to be extended. For that, our March 1982 proposals were only a small step forward. 
There is still a long road to monetary union.". 
24  As also remarked by Delors, cf. Hay, 1989, 17. Marris’ remarks about the OECD apply also to the 
European Commission: ‘“good economics” merges almost imperceptibly into the art of persuasion’, 
(Marris, 1986, 113). 
25  "The real instrument is persuasion, since basic standards can never replace the quality of the argument. 
While the action comes from others in these non-operational areas, the Commission nevertheless has two 
instruments at its disposal: professionalism and the possibility to tell the truth."   
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instruments et les méthodes de travail dans le but de réduire, et si possible de combler, le 
"retard", de la DG II en matière d'analyse et de politique économique26" (Padoa-Schioppa, 
1983, 14). 
 
A crucial objective for Padoa-Schioppa was then a strengthening of the analytical capacity 
of DG II, "Un effort particulier pour élever la capacité d'analyse économique de la DG II a 
été accompli, en agissant sur deux éléments que j'appellerais "intelligence" et "modèles 
d'excellence". Par "intelligence" j'entends l'élément de capacité d'analyse économique qui 
entre, ou devrait entrer, dans une très grande partie des travaux de la DG II; par "modèles 
d'excellence" les opérations, les papiers, les études, ou les publications dans lesquels on 
essaie d'atteindre un niveau de qualité particulièrement élevé, avec pour objectif d'obtenir 
non seulement un résultat de haute qualité, utile en soi, mais aussi d'exercer un effet 
d'entraînement, d'imitation, sur les méthodes à appliquer et les résultats à atteindre dans 
d'autres domaines27" (Padoa-Schioppa, 1983, 15). 
 
An important element in his strategy was a reorganisation of DG II, in March 1980, with at 
its core a new Directorate, Macroeconomic Research and Policy. The establishment of 
this Directorate reflected a double aim. The methodological purpose was to pursue more 
academic-oriented research, as clearly indicated in the word Research in the name of the 
new Directorate. The other purpose was to focus on macroeconomic policy for the 
European economy as a whole. This also reflected the idea that the Commission could 
have more influence on economic policies in the Member States if it could highlight the 
Community dimension of a certain national policy stance. The head of the C Directorate 
was usually the main author of the Annual Economic Report, the Commission's most 
important macroeconomic policy document. The Directorate consisted of five units: 
concerted action (a newly created division, responsible for a 'horizontal' analysis of the 
Community economy and for policy actions at the Community level); short-term forecasts 
(responsible for the coordination and consistency of the forecasting exercises); business 
                                                 
26  "Having been a national civil servant, I knew that the Commission's analyses and standpoints on economic 
and monetary policy would not attract the same amount of attention and enjoy the same prestige as those 
from other international organisations. The Commission's documents had a reputation of being too 
numerous, often inaccurate, analytically poor and not very original. I have devoted a lot of my time to 
acting on the working methods and tools with a view to making up DG II's lost ground, and wherever 
possible catching up, in the field of economic analysis and policy.". 
27  "A major effort has been made to raise DG II's capacity for economic analysis, by working on two elements 
that I would call "intelligence" and "models of excellence". By "intelligence", I mean the economic analytical 
capacity that comes into, or should come into, a large part of DG II's work; by "models of excellence", 
operations, papers, studies or publications in which a particularly high degree of quality is sought, with the 
objective of obtaining not just a high-quality result, which is useful in itself, but also to exert a driving force, 
and imitation effect, on methods to apply and results to obtain in other fields"   
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cycle surveys (responsible for the coordination and aggregation of business and 
consumer surveys, which were carried out by different institutes in the individual Member 
States); medium-term forecasts; econometric models (a newly created division, the 
purpose was to give DG II more autonomy in econometric modelling, like at the Bank of 
Italy. This group would later be merged with the unit for medium-term forecasts). 
 
Other reforms also contributed to the strengthening of DG II's intellectual and analytical 
capacities, like the organisation of seminars (both by DG II economists and outsiders) and 
the reinvigoration of the group of advisers (economists, both academics and national 
policy-makers, who were working on a temporary basis at the Commission). 
Padoa-Schioppa also launched a new series of publications, called the “Economic 
Papers” (which were the sole responsibility of the author). This caused quite a stir in the 
Commission, as officials publishing in their own name in an official publication of the 
European Commission was a completely new phenomenon for the EEC executive. 
 
Of particular importance was the collaboration with the Brussels-based Centre for 
European Policy Studies (CEPS), especially with the foundation (and funding by DG II, cf. 
Ludlow, 1983, 2) of the CEPS Macroeconomic Policy Group. This Group was also known 
as the Dornbusch Group, after its first chairman. Padoa-Schioppa also presented a paper 
at the CEPS opening conference (Padoa-Schioppa and Papadia, 1983). 
 
DG II economists would have meetings with the members of the CEPS group, in which 
the macroeconomic situation and the policy challenges for the European Community 
would be discussed. The CEPS economists would offer their comments on policy 
documents of the Commission, particularly the Annual Economic Report, and they would 
also write their own paper every year. Initially, the Dornbusch Group was set up as an 
internal advisory group. Later, at the behest of the academics, it was decided to publish 
the Dornbusch Group papers, both as a CEPS paper and as a Commission Economic 
Paper. 
 
This triangular collaboration (Dornbusch Group, Commission, CEPS) offered DG  II 
several advantages: it strengthened the analytical and intellectual level of the economic 
policy debate, it allowed the Commission to penetrate into the world of the economic 
intelligentsia, and it exposed the services of DG  II to emulation and contradiction. 
Moreover, it was also a way to let top American academics get to know the European 




The Dornbusch Group's Economic Papers caused quite some turmoil, especially in the 
cabinets but also among the Commissioners. Several people asked the question why the 
Commission should pay people “who make our life difficult”. Senior DG II officials, like 
Padoa-Schioppa and Emerson, defended the principle of publishing the work of the 
Dornbusch Group. They argued that the cooperation with the Dornbusch Group was very 
important for DG  II, both for improving its analytical capacity and for increasing its 
influence in the academic world. Consequently, one had to “accept the rules of the game” 
and let the Dornbusch Group publish the results of its research. Here, they had the 
support of Ortoli, the Member of the Commission responsible for DG II. 
 
As mentioned earlier, in the early 1980s, the European economy was coping with severe 
stagflation, after the second oil shock of 1979 and high US interest rates. In its analysis, 
the Commission strongly emphasised the structural aspects of the crisis: “the 
accumulated back-log of adjustments and our growing incapacity to respond quickly to the 
recent changes in the economic environment. The increased structural rigidities in our 
economies and social behaviour have changed profoundly the long-term dynamics of the 
business cycle” (CEC, 1982, 11). 
 
In the 1980s, unemployment increasingly dominated the economic scene. Unemployment 
would become the main theme of the debate between the Commission and the CEPS 
Macroeconomic Policy group. The CEPS group, consisting mostly of “sophisticated 
Keynesians”, many with an American background, argued for a more reflationary fiscal 
policy. Their position was set out in a report: “Macroeconomic Prospects and Policies for 
the European Community” dating from April 1983, by G. Basevi, O. Blanchard, W. Buiter, 
R.  Dornbusch and R.  Layard. The Group argued that there was no evidence that 
“unemployment is all and without exception, or even predominantly, a real wage problem” 
(Basevi et al., 1983, 3). They favoured a coordinated expansionary policy, accompanied 
by incomes policy. 
 
In its analysis of the unemployment problem, the Commission strongly emphasised that 
economic growth had become less labour-intensive. According to its own estimates, the 
stock of capital per employed person had risen at an average annual rate of 2.5 % in the 
preceding decade (CEC, 1984, 24). The rise in relative labour costs, which was at the 
origin of this capital deepening, was not only the consequence of increases in nominal 
wages but also of the rise of non-wage labour costs. Substitution was further stimulated  
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as the cost of capital was kept low, partly due to fiscal advantages. For the Commission, 
the increase in public expenditure, as well as the structure of expenditure and taxes, were 
among the causes of rising unemployment. 
 
Another reason for the increase in classical unemployment, according to the Commission, 
were the growing rigidities in the labour markets in Europe. They were the result both of 
legislation and of collective bargaining agreements. These were generally introduced in 
the golden sixties, in order to protect weaker groups. However, the Commission noted 
that: “Some of these regulations have proved to be ill-adapted to new circumstances and 
may ... have hindered employment creation” (CEC, 1984, 33). 
 
The employment strategies, proposed in the Annual Economic Reports of 1982, 1983 and 
1984, were very broadly based and comprised: (a) a stable macroeconomic framework; 
(b) an improvement of the competitiveness of the enterprise sector, especially the 
strengthening of the Internal Market; and (c) measures concerning the labour market, 
including wage moderation, more differentiated wage settlements and a “systematic 
reappraisal of labour market regulations and conventions” (CEC, 1984, 34). 
 
In a certain sense, this debate can seem somewhat paradoxical: it was the policy-makers 
at the European Commission who were defending the “new” paradigm of supply-side 
economics, while the academics were in favour of the “old” Keynesian paradigm. It 
certainly shows that policy-makers can be open to new economic theories. It is also a 
clear indication that DG II, under the leadership of Padoa-Schioppa in the early 1980s, 
was very alert to what was happening in the academic world and integrated this into its 
analysis of the economic situation in Europe. Moreover, the Commission had just had a 
very bad, if not traumatic, experience with a coordinated Keynesian demand expansion. 
The “concerted action”, after the European Summit in Bremen and the G7 Summit in Bonn 
in 1979, led to an increase in inflation and balance-of-payments deficits in the early 1980s 
(Maes, 1998, 404). It led European Commission officials to focus on the supply side, 
especially the increased rigidities in Europe’s labour markets. These rigidities certainly 
distinguished Europe from the United States with its flexible markets. 
5.  THE LATER CAREER OF PADOA-SCHIOPPA AS AN ARCHITECT OF EMU 
For Tommaso Padoa-Schioppa, becoming Director-General of DG  II was a defining 
moment in his career and his life. He became immersed in several European networks, 




In Brussels, he got an inside view of how the European Commission worked and 
established good relations and friendships with many Members of the Commission and 
officials, in the first instance François-Xavier Ortoli, the Member responsible for DG II. 
Moreover, Ortoli introduced him to Jacques Delors, who was then chairman of the 
European Parliament's Economic and Monetary Affairs Committee. Sharing a profound 
European conviction and a visionary long-term approach, the two men immediately 
became close friends. Delors, in his Mémoires, mentions Padoa-Schioppa as one of the, 
"personnalités hors normes pour leur appui permanent et leur contribution positive. ... Le 
point commun, c'était que, quels que fussent les difficultés de la construction européenne, 
ils ne s'étaient jamais découragés. Il puisaient dans le capital d'inspiration des pères du 
traité et cherchaient toujours, dans cet esprit, à trouver des solutions. Cette fleur bleue 
qu'ils avaient en eux était impressionnante28" (Delors, 2004, 184). Padoa-Schioppa would, 
de facto, become Delors' trusted advisor on monetary and financial matters, on whom 
Delors would call in difficult and decisive moments. 
 
As Director-General of DG  II, Padoa-Schioppa also took part in several important 
meetings, like those of the Ecofin Council and the Monetary Committee, giving him further 
inside knowledge of the functioning of the EU institutions and enlarging his networks. Of 
particular importance was his involvement in the meetings of the Committee of Governors 
of EEC central banks. Ortoli, as Commissioner responsible for Monetary and Financial 
Matters, participated in the meetings of the Committee of Governors and Padoa-Schioppa 
was his alternate. So Padoa-Schioppa came to acquire a profound knowledge of the 
functioning of the central banks in the Community at the highest level. It would become a 
very valuable asset in his later career and in his European monetary integration projects. 
It made him a natural rapporteur for the Delors Committee. 
 
After his stay in Brussels, Padoa-Schioppa returned to the Banca d’Italia. When Delors 
became president of the Commission, he relaunched the process of European integration 
with the Internal Market programme. Padoa-Schioppa played an important intellectual role 
in the new Delors project, as Delors himself acknowledges: "Revenons à la locomotive de 
la relance: l'Objectif 92. Comme toujours, j'étais préoccupé par l'équilibre entre la fonction 
                                                 
28   "Outstanding personalities, which should be mentioned for their permanent support and the positive 
contribution they have made. ... The thing that all these men had in common was that, whatever the 
difficulties of European integration, they never lost heart. They drew inspiration from the Treaty's founding 
fathers and, in the same spirit, always tried to find solutions. This sentiment of enthusiasm that they had in 




du marché - qui allait prendre encore plus d'importance - et la régulation, avec ses 
politiques d'accompagnement et de correction. ... À mon habitude, dans toutes les 
initiatives que je prenais, je me préoccupais de le justifier par un raisonnement intellectuel 
et théorique. La chance a voulu que Tommaso Padoa Schioppa, à l'époque directeur de 
la Banque d'Italie, après avoir été directeur général à la Commission, vienne me voir pour 
discuter précisément de cet équilibre. Au cours de la conversation, il me rappelle - ce qui 
était très éclairant - les trois fonctions économiques dégagées par l'économiste Musgrave, 
l'allocation des ressources, la stabilisation, la redistribution. De mon coté, je plaide pour 
une réflexion approfondie qui étayerait notre approche de départ et sans désemparer, je 
crée un groupe de travail baptisé "Efficacité, Stabilité, Equité" que présidera Padoa 
Schioppa et qui, en 1988, justifiera cette théorie de l'équilibre entre marché et régulation. 
.... J'ai souhaité que ce rapport très utile soit publié en librairie. Il suffit d'en regarder les 
principaux chapitres: Vers un développement équilibre du système communautaire, Le 
marché intérieur, La mobilité des capitaux, La fonction de stabilisation macro - 
économique, La fonction de redistribution et le budget communautaire, Les conditions de 
la croissance29" (Delors, 2004, 235). This report on the implications of the Internal Market 
for the future of the Community (Padoa-Schioppa et al., 1987) contained also a warning 
that the liberalisation of capital movements was inconsistent with the prevalent 
combination of exchange rate stability and national autonomy of monetary policy. 
 
EMU came back on the agenda at the Hanover meeting of the European Council on 
27 and 28 June 1988. It confirmed the objective of Economic and Monetary Union and 
decided to entrust a Committee with the task of studying and proposing concrete stages 
leading towards this Union. The Committee was chaired by Jacques Delors, who had the 
confidence of Kohl and Mitterand, and, as a former Finance Minister, the technical 
                                                 
29  But let's come back to the driving force behind the revival: Objective 92. As always, I was preoccupied with 
the balance between the market function - that was going to become much more important - and 
regulation, with its accompanying and corrective policies. ... As I usually do in all the initiatives that I take, I 
was anxious to justify it by both intellectual and theoretical reasoning. Chance had it that Tommaso Padoa 
Schioppa, who was Director at the Banca d'Italia at the time, after having been Director-General at the 
Commission, came to see me to talk about precisely this equilibrium. During the course of the 
conversation, he reminded me - which was highly enlightening - of the three economic functions singled 
out by the economist Richard Musgrave, resource allocation, stabilisation, redistribution. I, for my part, 
called for an in-depth reflection that would back up the approach we were starting out from. Then I 
immediately went on to set up a working group christened "Efficiency, Stability, and Equity" which Padoa 
Schioppa was to chair and which, in 1988, served to justify this theory of equilibrium between market and 
regulation. ... I wanted this highly useful report to be published as a book. You only have to look at its main 
chapters: Towards a balanced development of the economic system of the Community, The Internal 
Market, Capital mobility, The macro-economic stabilisation function, The redistribution function and the 




expertise too. The governors of the central banks - in a personal capacity - were also on 
the Committee. Delors wanted them to be members, both because of their technical 
expertise and because this would bind them to the monetary union project. The 
Committee produced its report for the June 1989 meeting of the European Council 
(Committee for the Study of Economic and Monetary Union, 1989). Padoa-Schioppa, 
together with Gunter Baer, became Committee rapporteur. In this way, he had a very 
influential role, especially in the drafting of the report. The Delors Report came to assume 
a crucial role as a reference and anchor point in further discussions and negotiations on 
EMU, just as the Werner Report nearly two decades earlier. It would become the broad 
basis for the chapters on EMU in the Maastricht Treaty.  
 
Padoa-Schioppa played further an influential (behind-the-scenes) role in later 
negotiations, notably through his contacts with Delors and with the Italian delegation. He 
was a Special Advisor to the Guigou Committee (from June 1989 to October 1989), which 
prepared the questions to be addressed in the Intergovernmental Conference. Together 
with Umberto Vattani (Prime Minister Andreotti's diplomatic advisor) and Mario Draghi 
(then Director-General of the Treasury), he was also one of the three key Italian officials 
involved in the Intergovernmental conference, the so-called "Gang of Three" (Dyson and 
Featherstone, 1999, 495). One of Padoa-Schioppa's suggestions was the fixed date for 
the start of the third phase of EMU. As Delors tells, "Tommaso Padoa Schioppa, un des 
rapporteurs du Comité Delors, avait suggéré à Andreotti de proposer le 1er janvier 1999 
comme date définitive, ce qui, pour l'intéressé, était un bon moyen de se mettre en avant 
et de persévérer dans la tradition d'une Italie toujours à l'avant-garde de la construction 
européenne30" (Delors, 2004, 364). 
 
In June 1998, Padoa-Schioppa became a member of the first Executive Board of the 
European Central Bank. It was a coronation for his work and efforts for the creation of 
Economic and Monetary Union. However, he was also among the first to warn of the 
dangers of "a currency without a State"31. 
                                                 
30   "Tommaso Padoa Schioppa, one of the Delors Committee rapporteurs, had suggested to Andreotti 
proposing 1 January 1999 as the final date, which for him was a good way of taking centre stage and 
continuing with Italy's tradition as a country that was always in the vanguard of European integration." 
31   Europe's experience was also a source of inspiration for reform proposals for the international monetary 




Tommaso Padoa-Schioppa was one of the great architects of the euro. He is remembered 
in particular as co-rapporteur for the Delors Committee and as a founding member of the 
European Central Bank's Executive Board. He studied economics at the Bocconi 
University in Milan and at the Massachusets Institute of Technology (with Modigliani). He 
started his professional career at the Research Department in the Bank of Italy. 
 
For Tommaso Padoa-Schioppa, becoming Director-General of the European 
Commission's DG II (from 1979 to 1983), was a defining moment in both his career and 
life. At the Commission, his main priority was the European Monetary System, which was 
launched in March 1979. The early years of the EMS were difficult, with tensions on the 
exchange markets, several currency realignments and the shelving of plans for a second 
institutional phase. Padoa-Schioppa was very closely involved in several projects to 
strengthen the EMS and to improve economic policy convergence. Moreover, he tried to 
strengthen the position of the ECU and to relaunch European financial integration. The 
most forceful exposé of his ideas was probably the inconsistent quartet, stating that the 
combination of free trade, free capital movement, independent monetary policies and fixed 
exchange rates was not sustainable. 
 
The other main objective for Padoa-Schioppa, as Director-General of DG  II, was the 
strengthening of its analytical capacity. Coming from the Bank of Italy, and with strong 
contacts with the Anglo-Saxon academic world, Padoa-Schioppa sought to develop 
DG II's model-building capacity and its links with the academic world. As such, he played 
a crucial role in the professionalisation of economics at the European Commission. As 
Padoa-Schioppa emphasised, professionalism and "telling the truth" are probably the best 
ways that international institutions can contribute to strong and sustainable economic 
policies and performances. The professionalisation of DGII, together with the 
strengthening of the Monetary Directorate, were furthermore essential elements to 
prepare DG II for the important role it would play in the EMU process, also intellectually 
(for instance with the study "One Market, One Money", CEC, 1990). As such this is also a 
beautiful illustration of Padoa-Schioppa's emphasis on the importance of strong 
institutions, also in the process of European integration.  
 
At the Commission, Padoa-Schioppa became further immersed in several European 
networks. Of crucial importance here were his contacts with Jacques Delors. This would  
27 
 
be of enormous importance for his further career, becoming one of the architects of the 
single currency. However, he was also among the first to warn of the dangers of "a 
currency without a State". 
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